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Summary 
 
A large literature asserts a causal relationship between the quality of economic governance 
and economic performance. However, attempts to establish such a link at an aggregate level 
have met with considerable methodological criticism. This paper seeks to overcome this 
limitation. We match a panel of Vietnamese enterprises from 2006-2010 with a unique panel 
dataset measuring sub-national economic governance, and then exploit rules on the terms of 
local leaders and the mandatory retirement age to try to estimate a causal link between local 
governance and domestic private investment. With one exception, we do not find a 
significant relationship between most aspects of local economic governance and private 
investment. The exception is transparency, which is strongly associated with higher 
investment, although the weakness of our instruments makes it difficult to determine the size 
of the effect. Our results have significant implications for policy, given the prevailing 
assumption that changes in the quality of local economic governance will spur improved 
economic performance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The last two decades have witnessed a rapid expansion of the literature on the relationship 
between institutions, governance and economic performance. Starting with the seminal work 
of North (1981, 1989, 1990) there has been an appreciation of the importance of institutions - 
particularly those associated with the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property 
rights - in creating the incentives that give rise to economic growth (see Helpman (2008) for 
several recent studies).  
 
A fundamental dilemma facing all of these studies is the difficulty of showing a causal 
relationship between institutions and economic performance. After all, it is perfectly possible 
that economic growth provides the resources for and generates popular demand for better 
quality institutions. Considerable ingenuity has been expended to attempt to show a causal 
link running from institutions to economic performance. Most famously, Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) use settler mortality as an instrument for colonial institutions in an attempt to establish 
this causal link. They argue that whether settlers in early colonies set up high quality 
institutions or not was influenced by the prevailing disease environment. In places with high 
mortality, settlers did not, or could not, install good institutions, whereas in places where the 
environment was more benign, they did. Acemoglu et al. argue that, since early settler 
mortality is not plausibly related to long-run economic performance except through the 
influence that it had on institutional development, it can provide a mechanism of identifying 
the causal relationship between institutions and economic performance. 
 
However, the view of a strong causal link between institutions and economic performance is 
not universally accepted. For example, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that some measures of 
institutions currently in use reflect outcomes (such as respect for property rights) rather than 
structural institutional determinants. They find little relationship between measures of these 
deeper structural determinants and economic performance, but a potentially strong role for 
initial human capital. They argue that the available evidence supports the idea that good 
policies give rise to growth which then results in institutional improvements.1 
 
Work by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) reinforces the idea that the relationship between 
governance and growth may be bi-directional. They find a strong positive causal relationship 
running from better governance to higher per capita incomes, but also a weak and 
sometimes negative relationship running from per capita income to governance. They argue 
that this suggests the absence of ‘virtuous circles’ in which higher income leads to further 
improvements in governance. 
 
One of the weaknesses of most studies in this area is that they have focused on cross-
country data. Whilst this provides a large sample of countries and a relatively long time span, 
such studies are open to the criticism that there are important unobserved factors (e.g. 
culture) which may have an important influence upon economic performance and which are 
also correlated with governance, creating the possibility of biased estimates of the 
relationship between governance and growth. 
 
To combat these issues of causality, a more recent group of scholars have begun to look at 
variation in governance across sub-national units within countries, and have exploited natural 
experiments in the creation of institutions or policy to better identify the causal path between 
                                                
1  Moreover, there is dispute over which factors are most important in shaping institutions. Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) 
suggest that it is initial endowments, rather than the effect of disease patterns on colonial settlement, that determined the 
nature of the institutions constructed in different countries.  They show how extractive institutions controlled by elites could 
perpetuate inequality which in turn slows economic performance and reinforces the institutional status quo (a theme 
expounded in detail by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). 
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governance and economic performance. Because their data are higher quality and their 
measurement more exacting, these scholars have been better able to test the micro-logics 
that inform the theories linking governance and growth. For example, advances have been 
made in testing the relationship between property rights and entrepreneurial activity (Galiani 
and Scargrodsky 2006, Di Tella et al. 2007, Field 2007, Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Malesky 
and Taussig 2009).   
 
Sub-national studies have the strong advantage that the overarching political and legal 
framework and, to some extent, aspects of culture and language are more similar within the 
boundaries of a single country than they are across all countries in the world (although some 
countries have enormous diversities of ethnicity, culture and language within their borders). 
Sub-national analysis of this kind is becoming increasingly relevant for policy as many 
countries move towards greater political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation. Indeed, 
central governments and donor agencies often have an explicit objective of improving 
governance at the sub-national level on the grounds that this will improve local economic 
growth. Again, this assumes that the causal relationship runs from governance to growth; if 
the relationship ran in the other direction, then efforts to improve local institutions might have 
little impact on economic performance. 
 
One of the difficulties in resolving the causal impact of governance on local economic 
performance is that the measurement of performance in some studies is still at a rather 
aggregate level e.g. sub-national GDP growth. To address this, several researchers have 
narrowed the focus to the impact of governance on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). There is 
a very large literature on the determinants of FDI which typically points to traditional location 
advantages, including factor endowments, market attraction, labour costs and physical 
infrastructure as key to attracting FDI.2 
 
In our country of focus – Vietnam - Le (2007) provides a comprehensive analysis of the sub-
national determinants of FDI and finds that agglomeration economies play a key role in 
attracting investors. Similarly, Pham Huong Mai (2002), Nguyen Phuong Hoa (2002), Meyer 
and Nguyen (2005), Mirza (2003, 2004), Nguyen Phi Lan (2006), and Nguyen Ngoc Anh and 
Nguyen Thang (2007), point to conventional determinants of FDI including economic growth, 
market size, human capital, labour costs and the quality of infrastructure.   
 
Interestingly, this literature does not unequivocally point to the quality of local economic 
governance as a determinant of FDI. Although Malesky (2007) shows that there is a positive 
correlation between local economic governance and FDI, and Huynh (2010) argues that the 
quality of local post-registration services played a key role in attracting FDI, Vo Hung Dung 
(2011) points out that productivity, income and investment did not increase in line with 
improvements in the business environment in the Mekong delta, and Ngyuen and Nguyen 
(2007) find no relationship between the quality of local economic governance and FDI. 
 
There is also a growing literature suggesting that causality runs in the opposite direction i.e. 
that FDI influences local economic governance. Hewko (2002, 2003) and Lewis (2005) have 
provided a range of examples of how investors affect the policy environment in Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Malesky (2009) confirms this empirically, exploiting 
exogenous variation in countries’ exchange rate movements to estimate the impact of FDI on 
reform progress in 27 Eastern European transition states. In Vietnam, Malesky (2004) 
describes the channels of FDI influence on governance in 10 provinces and Malesky (2008) 
shows empirically how FDI has empowered sub-national leaders to push forward reform. As 
Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, although institutions may be exogenous to individual firms, 
an area’s population of firms creates pressures to establish institutions that best meet their 
                                                
2  See Coughlin et al. (1991); Head et al. (1995) for evidence on the US and Cheng and Kwan (2000); Head and Ries 
(1996); and Wei et al. (1999) on China. Kinda (2010) provides an assessment of the determinants of FDI across 77 
developing countries. 
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needs. Thus, they argue, political and social institutions determine the nature of firms, while 
firms collectively support the institutions that they come to rely on. 
 
Given the evidence for the bidirectional causality between sub-national governance and FDI, 
it is not surprising that the literature has struggled to find clear identification of the influence 
of local economic governance on FDI or other measures of economic performance. To 
achieve such identification requires three things. First, a narrow measure of economic 
performance at the firm level, rather than aggregate performance at the sub-national level; 
second, a time series for both economic performance and a credible measure of local 
economic governance; and, finally, a plausible source of exogenous variation in governance 
which does not influence firm-level economic performance other than through its effect on 
governance. This paper aims to provide all three of these. We exploit the Vietnam Enterprise 
Census from 2000-2010 which provides a rich set of firm-level data including information 
about (domestic) investment over the period. This is combined with data from the Vietnam 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) which measures several dimensions of provincial 
governance from 2005-2010. We exploit exogenous rules on term limits for provincial leaders 
and compulsory retirement age rules to try and identify a causal impact of governance on 
firm investment. 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our data and how we constructed 
our dataset. The following section elaborates our basic model and provides initial results. 
Section 4 then describes our identification strategy and presents the results from applying 
that strategy. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2 Data 
Our source of firm data is the Vietnam Enterprise Census. This is an annual census of all 
firms with more than 10 employees with an additional random sample of smaller firms. The 
data includes a wide range of information on firm characteristics including: sector, 
employees, assets, legal type, performance, source of capital, and investment. We have data 
from 2000 to 2010. The number of enterprises increased rapidly over this period from 42,123 
in 2000, to over 250,000 in the later years, reflecting the strong growth in private sector 
activity over the decade. Unfortunately, matching firms across years for the early years is 
extremely difficult. However, from 2006, a standardised firm identifier was used allowing us 
to construct an (unbalanced) panel of firms from 2006-2010.3  
 
Our final panel dataset contains 391,631 firms. Fifteen per cent of the firms are measured for 
all five years, but others are measured less frequently either because of firm entry and exit 
during the time period under investigation, or because they fell below the Government 
Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO) threshold of ten employees for inclusion in the census in 
a particular year and therefore were only subject to random selection, leading to gaps in the 
data. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the characteristics of the firms in the Enterprise Census broken down by 
year and firm size. As in many developing countries, the distribution of firms in Vietnam is 
strongly biased towards the bottom end, with a very large number of firms with a handful of 
employees and low revenues, assets, profits and levels of investment; conversely, there are 
a relatively small number of firms with substantial assets and investments.  
 
                                                
3  In a few cases, we discovered duplicate (or triplicate or more) observations with the same firm id. In these cases we had 
no way of determining which of the firms was the true match across years, so we deleted all firms with duplicate identifiers 
from the dataset. The characteristics of the firms deleted were statistically indistinguishable from those that were retained, 
so there does not appear to have been any systematic reason for the duplications that occurred. 
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Two interesting features arise from Table 2.1. First, we can see the rapid growth in the 
number of firms since 2005, with a 170 per cent increase over five years and particularly 
rapid growth of small firms. This likely reflects the official sanctioning of private sector activity 
through the Enterprise Law (2000) and the Unified Investment Law (2006). Secondly, 
Table 2.1 shows the impact of the 2008 macroeconomic crisis in Vietnam and the global 
financial crisis at the end of that year; median revenues, profits and investments fell markedly 
for small and medium sized firms between 2008 and 2009. Interestingly, the same is not true 
for large firms, suggesting they were in a better position to adjust to the shocks. The 
considerable heterogeneity amongst firms, as well as the existence of time-varying, covariate 
shocks has important implications for our identification strategy later. 
 
To measure the quality of local economic governance we draw on the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index (PCI). The PCI is a composite index of provincial economic 
governance which has been calculated each year since 2006 by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI).4 It is based upon a mail-out survey to a random sample of 
firms in each province.5 The survey asks a range of questions about firms’ perceptions of 
local economic governance, as well as concrete measures of their experience of local 
governance. A particular strength of the PCI is that it focuses on aspects of local governance 
which are under the control of the provincial administration. It therefore excludes factors such 
as the quality or availability of national roads, airports and ports which would bias the index in 
favour of larger cities or provinces. Firm responses to the questions are combined into a set 
of nine sub-indices6 reflecting provincial performance on: 
 
 Entry costs 
 Land access and tenure security 
 Transparency 
 Time costs of regulatory compliance 
 Informal charges 
 Proactivity of the provincial government 
 Business support services 
 Labour training 
 Legal institutions. 
 
Provincial scores on each sub-index represent the province’s performance on that topic 
relative to the performance of other provinces in Vietnam. The overall PCI index is a 
combination of the sub-indices, yielding an overall score for the quality of economic 
governance in each province.7 The published PCI scores use a weighted sum of the sub-
indices, with weights determined by the influence of each sub-index in predicting different 
aspects of firm performance. We use this published PCI, since it is observable to decision 
makers in firms and in government.  
 
One limitation of the annually announced PCI is that each year, minor changes are made in 
the methodology in order to keep up with current policy debates and accommodate the 
needs of stakeholders. Individual survey questions have been dropped, new questions 
added, and indicators re-coded over time. All of these re-calibrations have introduced 
additional error into the measurement of governance and limit the ability to compare scores 
                                                
4  A pilot PCI was conducted in 2005 but this did not cover all provinces in the country. 
5  The sampling frame for the survey is the list of firms provided by the provincial tax authority. For example, in 2007, 6,700 
firms were chosen randomly from the list of 177,815 firms provided by the tax office. To ensure representativeness, the 
sample is stratified by legal type of enterprises, sector of business and age of firm.  
6  From 2006 to 2008 an index measuring the extent of bias of the local economy towards State-Owned Enterprises was 
included in the PCI. However, widespread ‘equitisation’ of these SOEs made this less relevant and so this sub-index was 
removed from 2009 onwards.  
7  For full details of the construction of the PCI, see VCCI (2008). 
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in the survey over time. To address this problem, we created a mini-PCI, which re-constructs 
the entire index using only a consistent set of indicators and equal weights across time. 
 
In addition to the Enterprise Census and PCI data, we also draw on a range of provincial 
statistics from the GSO Statistical Yearbook.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of firms in the Enterprise Census 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Small firms 
(<10 employees)       
No. of firms 57,496 72,558 86,340 114,279 147,555 174,142
Employees 4 5 5 5 5 5
Revenues 660 1,699 1,507 2,086 584 552
Profits 1 7 10 14 2 2
Assets 450 1,014 986 1,310 1,709 2,178
Investment 312 500 609 876 318 1,126
Medium firms 
(10-99 employees)  
No. of firms 38,834 43,946 52,006 74,115 80,968 95,465
Employees 20 19 19 18 18 18
Revenues 2,720 2,760 3,535 4,281 3,370 3,475
Profits 24 26 35 32 28 24
Assets 2,100 2,500 2,760 3,541 4,746 6,614
Investment 361 411 507 918 599 1,126
Large firms 
(100+ employees)  
No. of firms 8,633 8,893 9,986 11,084 11,794 13,334
Employees 222 220 216 208 203 200
Revenues 28,784 32,763 39,828 44,234 48,360 54,600
Profits 256 349 521 382 676 671
Assets 28,037 31,732 34,552 38,703 45,038 53,432
Investment 2,100 2,203 2,986 3,200 3,300 3,371
All firms 
No. of firms 104,963 125,397 148,332 199,478 240,317 282,941
Employees 8 7 8 8 7 7
Revenues 1,392 2,429 2,241 3,028 1,231 1,215
Profits 8 14 17 20 6 6
Assets 1,000 1,507 1,512 2,000 2,439 3,317
Investment 500 512 635 927 713 1,200
 
Note: Figures are medians unless stated otherwise. Monetary values are in VND million. 
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3 Model specification 
Our empirical specification, which is simple and intentionally conservative, is displayed in the 
equation below. 
 
,**** 4321 ittiititititoit SOEPopTelPCIY    
 
The dependent variable (Y) is the natural log of investment in a given year, indexed by the 
firm id (i) and year (t). Firm ( ) fixed effects are employed, so that the analysis can isolate 
the empirical effect of annual changes in governance on individual firm’s investment 
decisions. This modelling decision essentially ensures that we are only looking at the impact 
of governance within individual firms. Time ( ) captures shocks in the data that occur in 
particular years of the survey (i.e. entry into the WTO in 2007 or the global financial crisis in 
2008) which may lead to correlation in the errors of respondents in those years. Using time 
fixed effects is a highly conservative approach that is less prone to spurious correlation 
caused by non-stationarity or serial correlation.  
 
The key causal variable is PCI, the PCI score for the province-year in which the firm was 
situated. Our core specification uses the unweighted PCI score that was reported in the 
annual reports for the PCI project (Malesky, multiple years). Subsequent specifications 
replace the unweighted PCI with the individual sub-indices in order to isolate which 
governance factor might actually be driving investment decisions. To ensure that the results 
were not influenced by the particular choice of variables or weights, we also re-ran all our 
analysis with the mini-PCI described earlier. 
 
Firm fixed effects address time invariant confounders to the analysis; however, they do not 
entirely remove the potential for omitted variable bias. Time variant factors at the provincial 
level could lead to bias if they are correlated with both governance and investment decisions. 
At the firm-level, the key threat is privatisation (equitisation) of some large state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) over the course of the sample. To address the fact that firms’ views of 
governance and investment calculus may change after privatisation, we add a dummy 
variable to capture the years that a firm was an SOE. At the province level, the quality of 
infrastructure and size of the provincial market both change over time in ways that could be 
correlated with both governance and investment. To address this possibility, we include them 
as control variables. We proxy infrastructure by the number of land lines per capita (Tel) and 
market size by population (Pop) within the province. Unfortunately, market size and 
telecommunications are highly correlated leading to multi-collinearity in some specifications. 
In the reported specifications, we usually report only the coefficients on telephones, although 
the effects of governance are robust to using population or both variables simultaneously. 
 
All models utilise ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered at the 
province level. Clustering is necessary because firms are nested within provinces, the level 
at which the PCI score is reported, and therefore there is a strong possibility that errors may 
be correlated among firms within the same province, leading to under-estimation of the true 
standard error. 
 
3.1 Results from naïve model 
Table 3.1 reports the results from the application of the above model. Panel 1 shows the 
results for the unweighted index and all nine sub-indices using the reported index (Actual 
PCI). Panel 2 replicates all analyses with the Mini-PCI scores.  
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The first thing to notice is that overall economic governance, whether measured by the actual 
unweighted PCI (Model 1) or mini-PCI (Model 11), is not significantly correlated with firm 
decisions to expand their investment. However, overall governance conflates a great deal of 
institutional mechanisms and policy processes. It is entirely possible that certain locations 
may excel at one aspect of governance while performing poorly on others. This would limit 
variation and make it difficult to detect an association with investment. Moreover, if a specific 
policy process is actually responsible for investment, including it in an additive index may 
simply create noise that obscures the identification of a relationship. To guard against this 
possibility, we replicated the original specification, but this time regressed investment on 
each individual sub-index of the PCI in Table 3.1 (Models 2-10 and Models 11-20).  
 
Once again, the results are striking in the rejection of a robust relationship between 
governance and investment decisions. Only one aspect of governance is positively 
correlated with decisions to expand investment – transparency.8 This confirms the results of 
previous PCI reports, which have consistently found transparency to be the most influential 
sub-index in regression analyses. 
 
Not only is the transparency score statistically significant, but the effect is quite large. A one-
unit change (about one standard deviation) in the ten-point index is associated with a 6.5 per 
cent increase in firm investment. When we employ the more consistent Mini-PCI, the effect is 
an even more pronounced 9 per cent increase. A one-unit change is well within the reach of 
a province’s leadership. Over the timeframe covered by the PCI, the average province 
improved its transparency (2006 to 2010) score by 0.8 points with a standard deviation of 
three points, implying that some provinces drastically improved their score over time. Ceteris 
paribus, a one standard deviation improvement in PCI scores between 2006 and 2010 would 
have been associated with between an 18 per cent and 27 per cent increase in total private 
sector investment in the province. In short, transparency appears to pay large dividends. 
 
 
                                                
8  The private sector development sub-index is also statistically associated with investment, but this effect is not robust to 
the choice of the PCI index. 
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Table 3.1 Correlates of firm level investment - Panel 1: Actual PCI scores 
Dependent Variable = 
Annual Investment 
Growth  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Unweighted PCI (lag) 0.013 
  (0.011) 
Entry costs (lag) 0.001 
  (0.073) 
Land (lag) 0.013 
  (0.050) 
Transparency (lag) 0.065* 
  (0.036) 
Time costs (lag) -0.005 
  (0.035) 
Informal charges (lag) -0.014 
  (0.053) 
Proactivity (lag) -0.007 
  (0.046) 
Priv. dev't. (lag) 0.047 
  (0.029) 
Labour policy (lag) 0.017 
  (0.035) 
Legal policy (lag) 
  
Telephones per capita 
(ln, lag) 0.983 1.013 1.281 1.205 0.833 1.257 1.293 1.324 0.852 1.257 
  (0.711) (1.115) (1.171) (1.240) (1.150) (1.153) (1.211) (1.338) (1.017) (1.155) 
State owned enterprise 0.139 0.056 0.219 0.179 0.065 0.209 0.234 0.228 0.023 0.202 
  (0.261) (0.432) (0.473) (0.460) (0.411) (0.419) (0.458) (0.466) (0.366) (0.415) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.649** 5.371 4.127 4.400 5.065 4.798 4.098 4.627 5.751* 4.171 
  (2.190) (3.555) (3.795) (3.857) (3.447) (3.660) (3.802) (4.013) (3.218) (3.639) 
Observations 438,578 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 
Clusters 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.728 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 
RMSE 1.344 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 
OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered at province level, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3.1 Correlates of firm level investment - Panel 2: Mini PCI scores 
Dependent Variable = Annual 
Investment Growth  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Unweighted PCI (lag) 0.007 
  (0.013) 
Entry costs (lag) -0.009 
  (0.093) 
Land (lag) 0.060 
  (0.045) 
Transparency (lag) 0.091** 
  (0.036) 
Time costs (lag) -0.033 
  (0.039) 
Informal charges (lag) -0.012 
  (0.064) 
Proactivity (lag) -0.021 
  (0.076) 
Priv. dev't. (lag) 0.072** 
  (0.032) 
Labour policy (lag) 0.023 
  (0.040) 
Legal policy (lag) -0.014 
  (0.046) 
Telephones per capita (ln, 
lag) 1.267 1.276 0.666 0.884 1.152 1.262 1.193 1.360 1.371 1.284 
  (1.168) (1.208) (1.371) (1.076) (1.156) (1.225) (1.293) (1.148) (1.254) (1.187) 
State owned enterprise 0.213 0.233 -0.012 0.090 0.116 0.235 0.204 0.205 0.236 0.224 
  (0.428) (0.494) (0.498) (0.385) (0.446) (0.426) (0.456) (0.433) (0.452) (0.435) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 4.077 4.645 5.784 4.751 5.242 4.078 4.370 4.443 3.823 4.464 
  (3.694) (3.966) (4.109) (3.274) (3.902) (3.700) (4.064) (3.823) (4.007) (3.809) 
Observations 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 376,091 
Clusters 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 
RMSE 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.363 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.363 1.364 1.364 
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3.2 Transparency 
Given the standout performance of transparency, it is worth exploring this particular sub-
index in more detail. As noted above, PCI reports have often detailed the importance of 
transparency for firm decision-making. Remarking on the importance of transparency in 
Vietnam, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry wrote: 
 
In such an opaque business regulatory environment, it is difficult for entrepreneurs to 
make strategic decisions on investment as they lack the ability to accurately assess the 
associated costs and risks. Better and easier access for firms to legal and regulatory 
information, along with transparent administrative procedures should greatly diminish 
the current need for personal relationships in dealing with provincial authorities. When 
implemented properly, these measures should go a long way towards eliminating the 
practice of informal charges. 
(VCCI 2008) 
 
The transparency sub-index is a composite index created from eight indicators measured 
over time. It measures whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal 
documents necessary to run their business, whether those documents are equitably 
available, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably 
implemented, and the business utility of the provincial web page. Indicators are divided into 
four baskets: 
(1) Access to important legal and planning documents that may affect firms’ strategic 
planning and risk calculations.9 
(2) The equity and consistency of access to documentation – are relationships or 
negotiations required to obtain the needed information? 
(3) Participation in the drafting of local regulations and providing input on implementation. 
(4) Openness of the provincial web-page – a simple count of 15 documents and whether 
they can be obtained on the province’s banner website with five points allotted for web 
traffic.  
 
Table 3.2 provides the specific indicators used to create the overall sub-index. All measures 
are re-scaled to a 1 to 10 point index and averaged to create a province’s final score within 
the year.  
 
Since 2006, access to legislation has been better than access to planning documents, due to 
Vietnam’s commitments under WTO accession, which required the publication of local 
gazettes. After peaking in 2008, however, access to legal documentation in the median 
province has declined marginally while the gap between the most and least transparent 
provinces doubled. Similarly, access to planning documents, which is not required by WTO 
commitments, declined over the period, although an incremental improvement between 2010 
and 2011 brought the median province back to its 2006 level. Access to planning documents 
is important for levelling the playing field between investors with connections to provincial 
governments and those without such links. Without transparency of land and infrastructure 
plans, investors may under-invest out of fear that changes in local plans will negatively affect 
them. 
 
                                                
9  Each year, the PCI asks respondents to rank their access to government documentation necessary for operating a 
business on a five-point scale, ranging from 1) Impossible to 5) Very Easy. These documents divide neatly into two 
categories: 1) Legal Normative Documents (e.g. Central Laws, Provincial Implementing Documents, and the Provincial 
Budget) and 2) Planning Documents (e.g. State Investment Plans, Infrastructure Roll-Out Plans, Land-Use Maps). 
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Table 3.2 Indicators for provincial transparency scores 
 
1. Access to documentation                 
Indicator Measure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Transparency of planning documents† 
Min 1.90 2.25 2.20 2.25 2.13 2.00 2.29 
Median 2.36 2.63 2.51 2.55 2.44 2.31 2.50 
Max 3.80 3.17 2.96 2.79 3.08 2.62 3.04 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.39* 0.64* 0.61* 0.49* 0.48* 
Transparency of legal decisions and 
decrees† 
Min 2.05 2.86 2.63 2.80 2.68 2.79 2.58 
Median 2.81 3.15 3.05 3.11 3.11 3.05 3.04 
Max 3.71 3.53 3.38 3.36 3.61 3.44 3.83 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.31* 0.61* 0.59* 0.38* 0.56* 
2. Equity and consistency of access   
Indicator Measure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Relationship important or very important to 
get access to provincial documents (% 
Important or Very Important) 
Min 50 31.48 38.4 33.57 45.57 37.28 41.52 
Median 72.11 62.5 56.6 49.82 61.26 78.64 75.00 
Max 100 77.14 73.4 67.9 78.26 95.71 93.33 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.27 0.38* 0.55* 0.37* 0.30* 
Negotiations with tax authority are an 
essential part of doing business (% Agree or 
Strongly Agree) 
Min 52.17 47.17 24.1 17.39 29.69 23.75 7.58 
Median 75.22 61.05 44.7 36.71 41.32 40.78 40.51 
Max 96.15 86.96 73.2 54,25 62.4 67.04 63.16 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA -0.16 0.52* 0.73* 0.36* 0.27* 
Predictability of implementation of central 
laws at the provincial level (% Usually or 
Always) 
Min 4.35 2.76 1.89 1.03 3.57 2.38 0.00 
Median 14.91 9.49 7.96 6.94 8.4 8.97 8.57 
Max 60.38 37.88 18.3 15.69 22.22 20.24 29.49 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.38* 0.46* 0.3* 0.50* 0.10 
Friends important for negotiating with 
government (% Important or Very Important) 
Min 34.35 37.74 38.7 40 
Median 56.07 57.21 54.7 53.04 DROPPED DROPPED DROPPED 
Max 80 82.35 65.1 67.47 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.22 0.45* 0.55* 
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3. Participation in local decision making   
Indicator Measure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Do business associations play an important 
role in advising and countering provincial 
polices (% Important or Very Important)** 
NEW INDICATOR 
Min 18.64 15.15 13.64 
Median 35.71 37.04 31.37 
Max 57.32 55.56 60.61 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.32* 
Firm gives comments on government 
regulation(%)* NEW INDICATOR 
Min 15.04 11.36 4.9 
Median 25.21 22.37 15.8 
Max 43.9 38.35 35.4 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.55* 
Province discussed changes in laws with you 
(% Usually or Always) 
Min 0 0 0.9 1.21 
Median 12.16 8.84 7.57 8.57 DROPPED DROPPED DROPPED 
Max 61.54 20.9 21.62 18.6 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA -0.29 0.45* 0.52* 
Services provided by provincial agencies: 
consulting on national and provincial 
regulations (% Very Good or Good). 
Min 24.49 30.3 6.67 
Median 48.05 48.28 20.08 DROPPED DROPPED DROPPED 
Max 60.94 72.84 33.77 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.63* 0.53* 
4. Openness of provincial web page   
Indicator Measure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Openness of provincial web page score ψ 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 9.00 
Median 10 9 13.75 14.25 15 15.00 15.00 
Max 21 18 20 20 20 19.00 20.00 
Correlation w/Previous Year NA 0.36* 0.51* 0.70* 0.74* 0.79*   
* Significant at 5% level; NA = not applicable. 
All values are at the provincial level. 
2005 data only include 42 provinces. 
† Indicators result from factor analysis of 13 documents. In 2009, the scale was simplified to reflect the average access on a 5 pt. scale 
(1 very difficult to 5 very easy).    
ψ In 2007 and 2008, 0.5 values were allowed to denote provinces that provided the relevant information, but not in a sufficient manner to 
be useful.    
** Only business association members respond. 
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Table 3.3 Transparency and firm level investment growth 
 
  Using actual PCI scores Using mini-PCI scores 
Dependent Variable = 
Annual Investment Growth  
Trans Infra Pop SOE Trans Infra Pop SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unweighted PCI (lag) 
  
Transparency (lag) 0.073** 0.067* 0.065* 0.065* 0.099*** 0.093** 0.091** 0.091** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Telephones per capita (ln, 
lag) 0.673*** 0.833 0.835 0.660*** 0.884 0.886 
  (0.228) (1.150) (1.151) (0.226) (1.076) (1.076) 
Population (ln, lag) 0.065 0.066 0.090 0.091 
  (0.411) (0.411) (0.385) (0.385) 
State owned enterprise 0.220 0.219 
  (0.178) (0.178) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 5.738*** 5.604*** 5.065 5.054 5.639*** 5.509*** 4.751 4.740 
  (0.198) (0.220) (3.447) (3.448) (0.203) (0.208) (3.274) (3.275) 
Observations 377,072 376,091 376,091 376,091 377,072 376,091 376,091 376,091 
Clusters 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 0.754 
RMSE 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.364 1.363 1.363 1.363 
OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered at province level, in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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One of the reasons why some provinces score poorly on transparency is that personal 
relationships can be of critical importance for accessing business documentation. Three 
quarters of investors in the median province believe that having friends or family in 
government is important for accessing planning and legal documents (up from 52 per cent in 
2007). It is unclear why personal connections have grown in importance over time, but their 
salience likely affects the efficiency of businesses in two ways. First, by favouring those with 
connections instead of those with the best ideas and talent, local governments negatively 
influence the quality of businesses in their province. Second, all investors must invest time 
and resources into developing connections that might be better spent on their operations. 
 
Table 3.3 subjects the transparency finding to multiple robustness tests to see whether the 
coefficient remains stable with different combinations of firm and province-level control 
variables. With both actual and Mini-PCI data, the relationship remains strongly robust.  
 
 
4 Identification strategy 
The regressions above suggest that transparency is causally related to increases in 
investment. However, the simple model above does not prove that this is the case, because 
there are a number of other ways in which the observed results might be coming about. This 
section considers possible criticisms of our attempt to identify a causal effect and applies an 
instrumental variable approach to addressing the most serious potential critique. 
 
While simultaneity bias is an unlikely concern, as it is difficult to imagine how individual firm 
investment decisions could influence provincial transparency, unobserved heterogeneity 
remains a serious threat to causal identification. One form of this is the notion of halo effects 
– that firms’ satisfaction with their own business success colours their views of the quality of 
local governance (Kurtz and Schrank 2007). One would imagine, however, that halo effects 
would affect every sub-index and not just transparency, especially because the presence of 
the web page results makes it less reliant on solely perceptions based measures. Another 
form of unobserved heterogeneity is that a third, unobserved, feature of the province (i.e. 
culture or entrepreneurial history) is driving both annual changes in investment and 
improvements in governance. In Vietnam, this argument has been made about the South, 
which only spent 11 years under strict central planning and has long been thought to have 
more dynamic business managers and leaders than the rest of the country (Nguyen et al. 
2004). 
 
To address this problem, we rely on a quasi-experiment provided by exogenous leadership 
changes over the course of the sample. People’s Committee chairmen are allowed by law to 
only serve two terms, before seeking higher office in Hanoi or as party secretary of the 
province. Because of the prospects for promotion, People’s Committee Chairmen have a 
strong incentive to generate stellar economic performance in their latter term. If they are 
especially strategic, they may even seek to dampen performance in the first term to highlight 
the growth in the second period (See Whiting 2000, Landry 2008, Gang 2009, and Xu 2011 
for evidence of such behaviour in China). Thus, we expect a second-year chairman to have 
greater performance on economic governance than newly appointed leaders. There is, 
however, an exception to this hypothesis, which is second-term leaders who are approaching 
the mandatory retirement age of 65 may not be as willing to pursue dramatic governance 
reforms in the twilight of their careers. Without the prospect of promotion before them, other 
motivations may prevail, such as the willingness to not rock the boat for future leaders or, in 
cases of especially problematic governance, retiring leaders may use the second term to 
protect rents acquired over the course of their tenure. We use these insights as the basis for 
an instrumental variables strategy. We regress transparency on two instruments: 1) a 
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dichotomous variable if the People’s Committee chairman is in his/her second term; 2) a 
dichotomous variable if the chairman will turn 65 during the second term.  
 
These results are displayed in Table 4.1 below. The results confirm our hypotheses. 
Chairmen in their second terms are more likely to pursue transparency reforms. Having a 
second-term chairman is associated with a 0.1 movement in the ten-point transparency 
score. This does not seem like much until we consider that the average annual change in 
provincial scores was -0.06. On the other hand, retiring officials were not reform oriented as 
we predicted. Having a retiring chairman was associated with 0.22 smaller changes in 
transparency.  
 
 
Table 4.1 First stage determinants of governance 
 
Dependent Variable=Transparency Actual Mini 
(1) (2) 
Chairman reached retirement age  -0.220** -0.141** 
  (0.095) (0.066) 
Chairman is in second term 0.099* 0.063 
  (0.051) (0.047) 
State owned enterprise -0.051** -0.050** 
  (0.022) (0.020) 
Telephone per capita (ln, lag) 0.819*** 0.858*** 
  (0.271) (0.228) 
Unweighted (lag) 
  
Transparency (lag) 0.527*** 0.549*** 
  (0.047) (0.046) 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Constant 3.063*** 3.244*** 
  (0.311) (0.282) 
Observations 614,849 614,849 
Clusters 63 63 
R-squared overall 0.542 0.527 
RMSE 0.480 0.457 
OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered at province level, in 
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
Unfortunately, standard metrics for measuring instrument strength, such as the Wald-F test 
and Sargan diagnostic indicate that although the correlation is significant, the relationship is 
weak. The instruments explain too little of the overall variation in reform effort. Weak 
instruments have been shown to be associated with bias in the second stage (Bound et al. 
1995). This finding can be observed in Table 4.2, where we report the second stage results. 
The coefficients on the first lag of transparency, the variable predicted by the instrument are 
strongly significant, but are also heavily inflated. For instance, in the case of the actual PCI 
score, the coefficient is ten times the size of the naïve model. Consequently, while we feel 
comfortable that the direction of the causal effect of transparency is robust, we cannot 
provide precision on the size of that effect once endogeneity is taken into consideration.  
 
Weak instrument strength is difficult to overcome in this case, as only 10 leaders (out of 357) 
reached their second term in our sample. Although these leaders presided over 32,000 firm 
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years (about 10 per cent of our sample), there is simply too little power in the province-level 
of analysis to precisely estimate the effect of the term-limit.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Determinants of investment growth (IV-2SLS) 
 
Dependent Variable = Annual Investment 
Growth  
Actual Mini 
(1) (2) 
Transparency (lag) 0.598* 0.440 
  (0.335) (0.286) 
Transparency (lag 2) 0.150*** 0.087** 
  (0.057) (0.040) 
State owned enterprise 0.289** 0.257** 
  (0.126) (0.126) 
Telephones per capita (ln, lag) -0.478 -0.322 
  (0.794) (0.703) 
Year FE YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 248,238 248,238 
Clusters 64 64 
R-squared 0.011 0.026 
Sargan P 0.386 0.498 
Sargan statistic 1.906 1.393 
OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustered at province level, in 
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper set out to try and pin down the causal relationship between governance reform 
and private investment in Vietnam. As the literature shows, this is not an easy task, since the 
impact is potentially confounded by endogeneity, halo effects, unobserved heterogeneity and 
insufficiently precise measures of the relevant variables, particularly when they are measured 
at an aggregate level. We argued in the introduction that successful identification would 
require three things: a narrow measure of economic performance at the firm level and over 
time; a time series of credible measures of local economic governance; and a plausible 
source of exogenous variation in governance which does not influence firm-level economic 
performance other than through its effect on governance.  
 
By focusing on firm-level investment data from the Vietnam Enterprise Census we have a 
precise measure of economic performance. Using the PCI panel, we have a rich and credible 
set of governance indicators at the local level. Together these allow us to effectively address 
both individual time-invariant heterogeneity and covariate time-varying shocks. Moreover, by 
exploiting exogenous characteristics associated with term limits and the provincial leader’s 
age we have constructed a plausible identification strategy. Unfortunately, our instruments 
are too weak to have any reasonable degree of confidence in the size of the effect identified; 
the estimated coefficients for the impact of transparency on investment are clearly inflated as 
a result. However, we believe that we have identified a clear causal impact of transparency 
on private sector investment (and equally found that many other aspects of local governance 
have no discernible impact on investment).  
 
We find the substance of our results striking. First, consider what we did not find. We find no 
evidence for a systematic causal relationship between most aspects of local economic 
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governance and private investment. To recap, we discern no impact on investment from: 
lower entry costs, better access to land, smaller time costs, reduced informal charges, a 
more pro-active local government, better private sector development programmes, greater 
labour flexibility, and a better legal environment. This is quite remarkable since, as discussed 
earlier, there is a voluminous literature suggesting that each of these is important for 
boosting private investment and growth. Indeed many government and donor programmes 
focus on reducing entry costs (consider the huge policy emphasis in recent years on the time 
and cost to start an enterprise arising, in part, from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
surveys). Similarly, there has been considerable policy effort on reducing corruption and 
informal charges, promoting flexible labour markets and improving legal certainty. The fact 
that these aspects of governance do not appear to have a reliable association with private 
investment is puzzling.  
 
What are the possible reasons for not observing a robust association between these aspects 
of governance and private investment? One possibility is that an important effect exists, but 
that we still have not found it. There is a huge amount of noise in firm-level data, particularly 
in investment – it could be that this noise is swamping important effects. Whilst we cannot 
deny that this is possible, we are not convinced by this argument; we have an extremely 
large dataset and employ an extremely conservative strategy to account for heterogeneity. 
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a better dataset for exploring this question (unless one had 
the power to impose random governance shocks on sub-national governments).  
 
Another possibility is that the effects exist but are masked by negative reverse causality from 
economic performance to local economic governance (Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). In 
general, we find this idea attractive – it is entirely possible that, as countries or regions grow, 
the quality of their local economic governance deteriorates as actors attempt to capture 
rents. Moreover, Schmitz et al. (2012) find strong qualitative evidence of the role of the 
private sector in both driving and blocking economic reform in Vietnam’s provinces. However, 
in our particular context, it seems implausible that individual firm investments (of the very 
small size that dominate our dataset) are going to have a material impact upon the province’s 
economic governance.  
 
Thus, a little like Sherlock Holmes, we conclude that ‘When you have eliminated the 
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’ That is, we suggest 
that the above aspects of local economic governance, in fact, have a minimal impact upon 
firm investment. That does not mean that they are not desirable. Indeed, many surveys 
suggest that these are the sorts of changes that investors want. However, it is possible that 
these changes are introduced over time as economies and institutions develop, but have no 
particularly strong causal impact upon performance. As an analogy, improving local 
economic governance may be a bit like improving the interior design of your house – having 
nicely painted walls, pleasant pictures and comfortable furniture may make you feel good – 
but it has no discernible impact on the ability of the house to keep you warm and dry. 
Similarly, improving local economic governance may make investors’ lives more comfortable, 
but they will invest when there are opportunities, and put up with (and lobby to reduce) the 
discomfort as they go along. 
 
Our second major conclusion appears to contradict our first. We do find a (probably) strong 
causal connection between transparency and private investment. Why should we observe an 
association with transparency, but not with any of the other aspects of governance 
measured? One possibility is that transparency and access to information are more 
fundamental requirements than the other aspects measured. If entrepreneurs are not able to 
access information about opportunities, they are unlikely to invest. Similarly, if they cannot 
obtain basic legal and regulatory information they will not even consider investing. Thus 
transparency may have a critical role in reducing the risks associated with investments. 
Another possibility is that transparency – by reducing the need for personal connections – 
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encourages more widespread investment. Without transparency, only those with personal 
connections can receive the assurances necessary to invest; with clear rules and processes, 
even those unconnected to the local elite can consider investment. Returning to our ‘house’ 
analogy – transparency would appear to be part of the House (along with public 
infrastructure, the existence of a key opportunity and proximity to markets) rather than part of 
the interior décor of policy. We are hopeful that future research will be able to pin down the 
precise pathways through which transparency affects private investment– and ascertain why 
so many other aspects of local economic governance appear to have so little effect. 
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